جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Reject short RFC 4121 MIC tokens in gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2 gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2() reads the token ID at ptr[0..1], the flags byte at ptr[2], and padding at ptr[3..7], then passes ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN and cksum_len to gss_krb5_mic_build_sg(). None of these accesses check read_token->len first. The minimum safe token size is GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) plus ctx->krb5e->cksum_len (12-24, depending on the enctype). All callers accept shorter tokens from the wire: - gss_unwrap_resp_integ() enforces only an upper bound (offset + len <= rcv_buf->len) before allocating mic.data = kmalloc(len) and passing it to gss_verify_mic(). A malicious NFS server can therefore supply a short checksum opaque, producing a small slab allocation that the Kerberos MIC verifier reads past. - gss_validate() enforces only len <= RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE (400) before passing the wire-supplied length to gss_validate_seqno_mic(), which constructs a mic xdr_netobj and calls gss_verify_mic(). - svcauth_gss_verify_header() enforces only checksum.len >= XDR_UNIT (4 bytes) before dispatching to gss_verify_mic(). - svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ() checks only that the checksum fits in gsd->gsd_scratch. Add a length guard at the top of gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(), before any ptr[] access or scatterlist construction. Well-formed MIC tokens from gss_krb5_get_mic_v2() already have exactly GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + cksum_len bytes, so valid traffic is unaffected.

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86c3d527303ec79805098bda3dfc4fa994757f59
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2e9e10f5a536befcdce64d3e6946dff42fb823e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/997577c52487181226775db3755079a3ba1d52b9
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/996dd15f60121bdd7896b4554458f8806d608063
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a946b2e7207f968902f2147ab9b30726f82f7ab
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b94f6719dcd9f7a609bc5f459f85795900e77d25