جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the message's MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php builds $filepath = $path . $filename . '.' . $ext and hands it to file_put_contents(), and the private saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/class/emailcollector.class.php writes to $destdir.'/'.$filename; the name reaches both from the attachment's own getName() or getFilename() value by way of the record-join, create-ticket and create-project operations. A traversal sequence in the filename therefore survives intact, so any sender who can email a mailbox that an EmailCollector monitors, which is the module's ordinary use for a support or ticket inbox, can place attacker-controlled content outside the per-object attachment directory without holding a Dolibarr account. Under the hardened layout Dolibarr's SECURITY.md requires, with htdocs read-only, the write is confined to the documents tree and corrupts or forges other objects' documents; where htdocs is writable the same primitive reaches a web-executable path. Version 24.0.0 applies dol_sanitizePathName() and dol_sanitizeFileName() before the write.

• https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/264a44defb5e438689c75679617f6edc4c038abc patch
• https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr product
• https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/blob/23.0.4/htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php#L187 technical-description
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dolibarr-9.0.0-through-23.0.4-path-traversal-via-emailcollector-attachment-filename third-party-advisory