جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

is_path_trusted in scripts/iib/api.py compares the requested path against each allowed parent directory with path.startswith(parent_path), without appending a path separator. A directory whose name merely begins with an allowed path therefore satisfies the comparison, so where /data/images is allowed a request for /data/images_private/secret.txt is treated as trusted and served by FileResponse, disclosing files the confinement was meant to exclude. Whether the check applies depends on get_enable_access_control in scripts/iib/tool.py: it returns true when IIB_ACCESS_CONTROL is set to enable, false when set to disable, and otherwise true when the host Stable Diffusion WebUI was started with share, ngrok, listen or server_name, falling back to false. Confinement is therefore active in the network-exposed WebUI deployments that rely on it, while a standalone run with no such option serves every readable file regardless of this flaw. The fix compares against parent_path joined with os.sep.

• https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/pull/969 issue-trackingpatch
• https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/commit/4057a624c7a23a36f0b4dc6a545b40767d602450 patch
• https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/blob/v1.8.0/scripts/iib/api.py#L329-L344 technical-description
• https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing product
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/infinite-image-browsing-is-path-trusted-prefix-comparison-omits-the-trailing-path-separator third-party-advisory
• https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/issues/968 issue-tracking