جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.34.0, AMQConnection.start() applies Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, frameMax) after Connection.Tune negotiation even though AMQP defines frameMax value zero as unlimited and ConnectionFactory.DEFAULT_FRAME_MAX is zero. When the client default and server-negotiated value are both zero, the result is passed to Utils.framePayloadLimit(int), which interprets zero as Integer.MAX_VALUE and disables the configured maxInboundMessageBodySize cap. A malicious AMQP server, or a man-in-the-middle attacker able to modify Connection.Tune and inject frames into the connection, can then send an oversized frame of any frame type, causing Frame.readFrom() to allocate a large byte array before content-level validation and potentially terminate the client process through memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 5.34.0.

• https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-jh4v-gfqj-7rhx x_refsource_CONFIRM
• https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2015 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2016 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/6d7c2bfe89796ca34d3531098fb59dd657fea39e x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/e7f10bf99aee103dd9f64b3e52a725fc9f9d3763 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.34.0 x_refsource_MISC