جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

OpenList a file list program that supports multiple storage. Prior to 4.2.4, the authenticated /api/fs/batch_rename handler in server/handles/fsbatch.go authorizes only the source directory produced by user.JoinPath(req.SrcDir) and validates renameObject.NewName with checkRelativePath, but does not validate attacker-controlled renameObject.SrcName, supplied as src_name, before concatenating it with the authorized path and passing the result to fs.Rename. A user with rename permission can use traversal segments in src_name to make path normalization select a file outside the authorized directory and configured base path, resulting in cross-user file integrity loss, limited availability impact, and file-existence disclosure through success or error responses. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.4.

• https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/commit/651da18da4c647d96648d4bb64462baac1c37e04 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/releases/tag/v4.2.4 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/security/advisories/GHSA-95cv-r8x4-vh75 x_refsource_CONFIRM