جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received. A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier message, causing an uninitialized memory read. Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that were actually read from the wire.

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1307028f082756bf453e1889aee9983d30643a4b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6cbf6878f3a1503c872ba8f1e69a58ee68d8b2e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72a35070fcefa229b1b031aa7482ad3788e18f07
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/340e0386aa39da181015bee38f309018c335ce16
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d60de8253c85a02d0e6194b0735e7a562981a04c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e7ebfaa0d14cf50e44041bfde38070d6dbc019f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d934c934ec746d53fc7e4f53239792647bbae63
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3c32939fa0e3ee9b883b9a0fd1972c5c444e3d0