جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

Quest Bot is an opensource Discord Bot. Prior to 1.1.9, the `image to GIF` command uses a request helper that validates a hostname's public IP addresses but then sends the actual request by hostname, causing a `second DNS lookup`. An attacker controlling a domain can return a public address during validation and an internal address during the connection, bypassing the internal-address protection through `DNS rebinding`. The command takes its address directly from user input and its developer-only gate is disabled in normal deployments, so any member of a server with the bot can trigger the flaw without special permissions. Requests are restricted to `HTTPS on port 443`, and content is returned only when the response is a `genuine image`. The impact is therefore mostly blind internal probing with limited retrieval of image responses from loopback or internal endpoints, not arbitrary internal-data disclosure. Common cloud metadata services using plain HTTP on another port are not reachable through this path. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.9.

• https://github.com/vantern-org/questbot/security/advisories/GHSA-hrp5-g9r6-8rq4 x_refsource_CONFIRM
• https://github.com/vantern-org/questbot/commit/eec5f57eda8caa37cd46520c57b3c01efef2b99b x_refsource_MISC