جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

identrail is a machine identity security platform for AWS, GitHub/OIDC, and Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.2, the default-on `POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete` endpoint in `internal/api/router.go` accepts `installation_id` from the request body or `X-GitHub-Installation-ID` header without verifying the installation belongs to the caller's workspace. `CompleteGitHubConnection` in `internal/api/github_connect.go` rigorously binds `state` to the caller's tenant, workspace, and project, but checks only that the installation ID is positive before persisting it as the caller's connection. `ListInstallationRepositories` in `internal/connectors/github/repositories.go` invokes token creation through `internal/connectors/github/app.go` and `POST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokens`, using the application's JWT. An authenticated tenant who starts a legitimate connection can supply another customer's non-secret installation ID to read the victim organization's private repository inventory, content, and metadata or drive posture scans, provided identrail's GitHub App is installed there. The default-off V2 `CompleteGitHubConnector` path shares the installation-ownership gap and additionally matches pending `state` without rechecking caller scope. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2.

• https://github.com/identrail/identrail/security/advisories/GHSA-cp3j-m783-3ph5 x_refsource_CONFIRM
• https://github.com/identrail/identrail/commit/835e40517509d6ef5405c27fbf14f579bedff0e7 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/identrail/identrail/releases/tag/v1.0.2 x_refsource_MISC