جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a Python SDK and command-line tool for managing OSCAL compliance documents. In versions before 3.12.4 and versions 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the catalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate author commands write generated Markdown to an attacker-influenced output path without path-traversal validation, allowing arbitrary file write outside the Trestle workspace. These commands join the user-supplied output argument onto the Trestle root and write to the result, but guard it only with an is_directory_name_allowed() task-name-collision check rather than the PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard used by the jinja command, so an absolute path or one containing traversal sequences escapes the workspace and writes files under an attacker-chosen location as the invoking process owner. The security boundary is crossed when a trusted CI job, shared service, or wrapper derives the output argument from repository-controlled, tenant-controlled, or otherwise untrusted data while expecting output to stay inside the workspace. When --force-overwrite is used, the selected output directory is first recursively deleted, extending the primitive to destruction of an attacker-chosen directory tree and enabling indirect code execution by overwriting files a pipeline later runs. This issue is fixed in versions 3.12.4 and 4.1.0.

• https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-r4vp-3vw6-r2x5 x_refsource_CONFIRM
• https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-4q5v-7g7x-j79w x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/37ed44f5f2e074202c8eb7c2f203c05d19461cdc x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/releases/tag/v4.1.0 x_refsource_MISC