جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

browse-mcp is a Playwright-based headless-browser MCP server for MCP-capable agents. Prior to 0.8.2, browser_download writes a fetched response body to join(save_dir, filename) without validating the caller-controlled save_dir, while browser_save_state and browser_load_state honor a caller-controlled path unchanged. A malicious MCP client, or an autonomous agent steered by indirect prompt injection on a visited page, can choose an arbitrary save_dir or state path and a URL whose response body becomes attacker-controlled file contents, allowing writes to any path the process can reach, including ~/.bashrc, autostart entries, or cron files, and potentially leading to host code execution. The force_fetch fallback also uses a raw fetch() that bypasses the BROWSE_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS origin fence. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.2.

• https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6p x_refsource_CONFIRM
• https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/pull/58 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/commit/5352a4a56f626254b445bfa07e4bb48c5aad15c1 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/blob/v0.8.2/CHANGELOG.md#082---2026-06-13 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/releases/tag/v0.8.2 x_refsource_MISC