جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

fast-mcp-telegram is a Telegram MCP Server. Prior to version 30.1, the send_message/send_message_to_phone MCP tools accept files as a list of http(s) URLs, which the server downloads and attaches to the outgoing Telegram message. Downloads are guarded by _validate_url_security, an SSRF denylist that checks the URL's literal hostname string but never resolves DNS. The fetch (httpx.AsyncClient.get) does its own resolution at request time. Consequently a hostname that resolves to a loopback / private / link-local address passes the guard and is fetched — even with the secure defaults block_private_ips=True and allow_http_urls=False. Because the fetched body is returned to the attacker as a Telegram file attachment, this is a full-read, exfiltrating SSRF, not blind. This issue has been patched in version 30.1.

• https://github.com/leshchenko1979/fast-mcp-telegram/commit/e6b3032cfc906e14f5b84f2c2b8ec378eb457e57 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/leshchenko1979/fast-mcp-telegram/releases/tag/0.30.1 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/leshchenko1979/fast-mcp-telegram/security/advisories/GHSA-xr72-j7vj-vp7g x_refsource_CONFIRM