جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs. While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private. Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct place which is during inode eviction.

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a92c5e5086a87d082696245a8607666da3d80554
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/667df93769c02ff581c77d2d8f162147e719c557
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ddb961d2929bbb3204a2bba21b5d8153cd3f7cc
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae10787d955fb255d381e0d5589451dd72c614b1
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eecce026399917f6efa532c56bc7a3e9dd6ee68b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13bc2772414d68e94e273dea013181a986948ddf
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a732ed26fbd048e7925d227af8cf9ea43fb5cc9
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3