جزئیات آسیب‌پذیری

OpenClaw (npm package 'openclaw') before 2026.7.1 incorrectly trusts requester provenance in message.action. In identity-bearing Gateway deployments (authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes), a write-scoped caller can supply another sender's identifier to the channel authorization checks and invoke a channel action under that spoofed requester identity, reaching operations the channel adapter would have denied to the real caller. Practical impact depends on the enabled channel, the action, and the target account's permissions. Shared-secret token and password callers are full trusted operators under OpenClaw's security model and are out of scope. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict message.action to administrators and disable sensitive channel actions that rely on requester identity.

• https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4wvr-f35r-f8w4 vendor-advisory
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-before-2026.7.1-authentication-bypass-via-spoofed-requester third-party-advisory