Vulnerability details

OAuth2 Proxy honours a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when deciding whether a request may skip authentication, because the guard added for CVE-2026-40575 is inert in the default reverse-proxy configuration. GetRequestURI in pkg/requests/util/util.go prefers that header over the real request URI whenever CanTrustForwardedHeaders returns true, and isAllowedPath in oauthproxy.go matches the skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex allow list against the resulting path. CanTrustForwardedHeaders in pkg/apis/middleware/scope.go grants that trust when the caller's address is in the trusted proxy set, and buildTrustedProxyNetSet falls back to defaultTrustedProxyIPs, which is 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0, whenever reverse proxy mode is enabled without trusted_proxy_ip configured. Every client is therefore treated as a trusted proxy. An unauthenticated attacker can request a protected upstream path while setting X-Forwarded-Uri to a value matching an allow-listed route, so the skip-auth decision is made against the spoofed value while the upstream receives the protected path unchanged.

• https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy product
• https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/blob/v7.15.4/pkg/apis/middleware/scope.go technical-description
• https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x vendor-advisory
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/oauth2-proxy-through-authentication-bypass-via-x-forwarded-uri-under-the-default-trusted-proxy-set third-party-advisory
• https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/issues/3506 issue-tracking