Vulnerability details

MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites. Prior to version 1.10.3, backend video access does not enforce the visitor role's intended public-only restriction when `loginEnabled=true` and a visitor password is configured. The frontend filter in `VideoContext.tsx` is only client-side, `roleBasedAuthMiddleware.ts` allows all visitor GET requests, and `storageService/videos.ts` performs `getVideos()` and `getVideoById(id)` queries without checking the caller's role or `visibility`. A visitor can enumerate `/api/videos` or request `/api/videos/:id` to retrieve hidden `visibility`=0 records, exposing titles, `sourceUrl` values, `videoPath` values, subtitle paths and `thumbnailPath` values. The `serveMountVideo()` path also serves mounted video files without `visibility` checks. Leaked paths work against unauthenticated `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` routes, allowing media downloads without credentials. The RSS visitor feed already filters `visibility`=1 content and is not the affected query path. Default loginEnabled=false single-user deployments are unaffected by this role-boundary issue because all callers are owner-equivalent. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.3.

• https://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/commit/456d09892b599e78538ef1a795f49b91256c3ca6 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/commit/7cc7c6a7d297ccbd8bd2c76755129381b96f8456 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/commit/905cecc010f320ab4e575eb3054179e9616a0b39 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/commit/f9ae048cc37c98a3576115d8841f8e96bade5c76 x_refsource_MISC
• ttps://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/tree/v1.10.3 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/security/advisories/GHSA-hcm6-w6x8-6jhr x_refsource_CONFIRM