Vulnerability details

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback); and have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled). If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly. Starting in version 2026.2.14, the upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw's temp uploads root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected.

• https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-cv7m-c9jx-vg7q x_refsource_CONFIRM
• https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3aa94afcfd12104c683c9cad81faf434d0dadf87 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14 x_refsource_MISC