Vulnerability details

Postiz signs its session, invitation and password reset tokens with one shared secret and without any marker of what a token is for. A route that refreshes the credentials of a browser-extension channel signed data taken from the request itself and stored the result where the requesting user can read it back. A user could therefore obtain a validly signed token containing any claims they choose, which the application accepts as a session, as an organization invitation with a chosen role, as a password reset or as an enterprise provisioning token. A second, narrower route that creates team invitations signs extra fields from the request body in the same way.

• https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app product
• https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app/releases/tag/v2.25.3 release-notes
• https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app/commit/a5affe62c74e39c1e7ac960d50d8418b807d532c patch
• https://gadvisory.org/advisories/PSA-2026-YT2HMH vendor-advisory